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A B S T R A C T
Objective: Clinical relationships are usually asymmetric, being deﬁned by patients’ dependence and
practitioners’ care. Our aims are to: (i) identify literature that can contribute to theory for researching
and teaching clinical communication from this perspective; (ii) highlightwhere theoretical development
is needed; and (iii) test the utility of the emerging theory by identifying whether it leads to implications
for educational practice.
Methods: Selective and critical review of research concerned with dependence and caring in clinical and
non-clinical relationships.
Results: Attachment theory helps to understand patients’ need to seek safety in relationships with
expert and authoritative practitioners but is of limited help in understanding practitioners’ caring.
Different theories that formulate practitioners’ care as altruistic, rewarded by personal connection or as a
contract indicate the potential importance of practitioners’ emotions, values and sense of role in
understanding their clinical communication.
Conclusion: Extending the theoretical grounding of clinical communication can accommodate patients’
dependence and practitioners’ caring without return to medical paternalism.
Practice implications: A broader theoretical base will help educators to address the inherent subjectivity
of clinical relationships, and researchers to distinguish scientiﬁc questions about how patients and
clinicians are from normative questions about how they should be.
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As a moral enterprise, clinical communication teaching
and research has placed patients’ rights at the centre of clinical
practice against a historical background of medical paternalism.
As a science it has reminded biomedicine of the need for
compassion in clinical care. However, conﬂation of morality and
science has allowed assumptions to develop in the ﬁeld that
constrain the theoretical framework within which communica-
tion researchers and educators work [1]. Our aim is to identify
areas of theory and research that can inform clinical commu-
nication and to highlight areas where further conceptual
development is needed. Then we test the potential practical
utility of this exercise by examining its implications for
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The imperative to involve patients as partners in care shapes
health policy and dominates teaching and research in clinical
communication [2]. As a moral statement, promoting patients as
equal partners enhances respect for their autonomy and human
rights.Asa scientiﬁc concept, typicallyoperationalisedas theneed for
information and choice [3], it proves problematic. Appreciation of
choice (such as between treatment options) is rare when patients
describe their care [4–8]. Although some value information and
choices, many do not [9–18], are too impaired by illness to exercise
informed choice or feel overwhelmed by it [19–21]. People who are
seriously illwant less involvement in care decisions thanpeoplewho
are healthy think they would want if they became ill [16,17,22,23].
Manypatientswantpractitioners toexercisetheauthorityassociated
with a traditional biomedical mode l [24], or have better outcomes
with such care [25,26]. For practitioners, allowing patients to make
potentially damagingdecisions can feel incompatiblewith caring for
them [27]. By prioritising autonomy above other considerations,
ideas of patient partnership and empowerment therefore risk
diverting care from the ethic and expectation of beneﬁcence [28].
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not necessarily as ends in themselves [15,29,30]. Faced with
serious illness, information can build hope or trust [11,30–33] or
help patients accept what doctors know is in their best interests
[4,34]. These ﬁndings are unsurprising if we acknowledge that
patients mostly seek health care because they have – or fear –
illness and want practitioners to help them. Reﬂecting this
inherent asymmetry in the patient–practitioner relationship,
clinical communication theory could, as a ﬁrst approximation,
model the patient as vulnerable and dependent and the practi-
tioner as expert and caring [1,35].
3. Towards a theory of dependence
3.1. Attachment theory
Although we shall see that it provides a very limited theory of
caring, attachment theory is an obvious starting point for
understanding dependence because it concerns people’s propen-
sity to seek relationships with individuals who can help them feel
safe when they are vulnerable [36]. ‘Attachments’, or ‘attachment
relationships’, are emotional bonds that lead an individual to seek
proximity to a safe or powerful person (the ‘attachment ﬁgure’)
when threatened. Attachments are thought to be based on ‘mental
models’ (i.e. enduring belief systems) of oneself and others. These
models are the product of how individuals have learned to regard
themselves and care-givers during childhood, and become
generalised to other dependent relationships [37]. Each mental
model varies from positive (trust of others; conﬁdence in oneself)
to negative (distrust of others; anxiety about oneself). These
mental models shape individuals’ expectations about relation-
ships. They underlie ‘attachment styles’, which are consistent and
enduring patterns in how an individual relates to people in
dependent relationships. A ‘secure’ attachment style indicates that
an individual has a positive mental model of self and others, while
an individual with an ‘insecure’ style has negative mental models
(Fig. 1).
Attachment theory originated in Bowlby’s [38] studies of young
children’s relationships with their parents, particularly mothers.
He argued that adults also rely on attachment at times of
vulnerability and noted that, beyond childhood, the focus ofFig. 1.Different theories of attachment describe different speciﬁc attachment styles
and label them differently, but all distinguish ‘secure’ from various types of
‘insecure’ attachment. Here, following Ciechanowski et al. [57,98], secure
attachment is distinguished from three styles of insecure attachment, each style
being deﬁned by the intersection of mental models of self and other. Each style has
different implications for behaviour in dependent relationships, and examples for
clinical relationships are shown.attachment shifts from parents to romantic partners or close
friends [39]. Empirically, there is evidence that attachment styles
persist from childhood into adulthood [40,41], although this is
controversial [42,43]. Continuity can be explained not just by the
enduring and generalized nature of thementalmodels but because
these lead to behaviours in interactions with others which
perpetuate them. For example, the guarded or over-dependent
behaviour of someonewho has experienced poor parental care as a
child will elicit behaviour in other people that perpetuates that
individual’s negative mental models [44].
Applying attachment ideas to adults exposes important
differences between adult and child relationships [45,46]. Classi-
cally, the currency of attachment is seeking and giving comfort and
proximity; material care is secondary. In other words, it is a theory
about feeling safe rather than being safe [47]. Whereas, from a
child’s perspective, being comforted will be the main indicator of
safety, adults will seek more evidence of the protective power of a
potential attachment relationship and, in particular, of the other
party’s ability to ameliorate the threat. With age also comes
increased ability to use symbolic representations of attachment
ﬁgures to substitute for physical proximity; for example having a
meeting arranged with an attachment ﬁgure could provide a sense
of safety [48]. Adults also seek security in appropriate distance and
separation as well as intimacy [46].
Attachment theory is not inimical to respect for individuals’
autonomy. Instead, attachment can promote a person’s autono-
mous self-regulation of distress [48] by strengthening self-concept
and enabling the experience of afﬁliation and caring from others
[49]. Understanding the dialectic between dependence and
autonomy will, however, require a broader scientiﬁc view of
autonomy than the current emphasis on information and choice in
health policy and related literature [50–52].
3.2. Attachment in clinical relationships
Even in the absence of serious illness, symptoms provoke
fears of mortality or threaten assumptions about life [53].
Recent theorists have emphasised that thoughts and images can
activate attachment needs [48] so we should expect that illness
is an arena in which intense attachment needs arise. Bowlby
envisaged these being directed to family, longstanding romantic
partners and close friends [39]. However, when illness is the
threat, these are rarely the people who can offer safety because
they do not have the expertise to manage illness. Several writers
have begun to apply attachment theory to clinical relationships
because, when threatened by illness, it is practitioners whom
patients regard as having the expertise and power to provide
safety [9,31,53–60].
Attachment style is related to health-care seeking, particu-
larly in the absence of serious disease [57,61], and to symptom
report and readiness to attribute symptoms to psychological
factors [57,61–63]. Attachment also helps to understand
patients’ behaviour when they consult. Patients with attachment
styles characterised by negative mental models of self or others
are more likely than others to be seen as ‘challenging’, or as non-
adhering to advice [54,64], perhaps because they ﬁnd it hard to
trust that practitioners have their interests at heart. In addition,
the framework of attachment styles can be used to categorise
patients’ different presentations in clinical settings and asso-
ciated communication problems (see Fig. 1) [56,64,65]. Attach-
ment theory points to patients’ previous experiences as potential
inﬂuences on clinical relationships. For example childhood
abuse, which disrupts the formation of positive mental models
of oneself and others [66], impairs patients’ abilities to form
supportive clinical relationships during primary treatment for
breast cancer [67].
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Attachment theory places patients’ seeking of safety at the
centre of clinical relationships, and emphasises their need to trust
practitioners’ expertise to provide that safety. However, pairing
‘communication’ with ‘safety’, ‘trust’, ‘expertise’ or feeling ‘cared
for’ as terms for searching clinical research literature is rewarded
by many fewer hits than pairing with ‘information-giving’ or
‘choice’. Current literature does, of course, recognise the emotional
quality of clinical relationships, and practitioners are already
encouraged to meet patients’ emotional as well as clinical needs
[68]. Indeed, distinguishing emotional from biomedical agendas is
ﬁrmly embedded in communication research and teaching [69],
and practitioners are criticised for prioritising biomedical ones.
Attachment theory challenges this division because it suggests that
patients can be helped emotionally – to feel secure and comforted –
by practitioners’ technical or biomedical care. It thereby helps to
explain why patients value doctors’ concern with emotional
factors and ‘small-talk’ less than communication experts might
expect [70,71], why psychosocial talk with the wrong patient or at
the wrong time can be experienced as intrusive [72–74], and why
being offered choice about treatment can damage trust in the
practitioner [9]. Indeed, a doctor whom a patient thinks is
prioritising psychosocial concerns over biomedical ones would
seem dangerous rather than reassuring.
The pursuit of safety, alone, is insufﬁcient to understand
patients’ commitment to clinical relationships because practi-
tioners cannot always guarantee the safety that patients seek.
Further theoretical development will be needed in this area, but
pointers are available. In some situations safety is probably
redeﬁned, for example as the prospect of painless death rather than
avoiding death [75]. Perhaps alliance or companionship with
practitioners offers a kind of safety in its own right. It is well known
that patients and practitioners often collaborate in building hope
[76], and it has been suggested that this is theway that doctors and
patients avoid the inherent tension between patients’ need for
safety and doctors’ frequent inability to provide this [77]. If hope is
the basis for many clinical relationships, we will need to
understand more about practitioners’ part in building or support-
ing it. Portmann [77] suggested that hope relies heavily onmedical
technology, which contrasts with the argument that technology is
inimical to feeling cared for [78].
3.4. Subjectivity in clinical relationships
Classically, attachment relationships are thought to be formed
through repeated interactions with care-givers, and to be called
upon in response to each new threat by seeking proximity to the
care-giver. However, clinical care-giving usually means brief
encounters with unfamiliar practitioners who cannot offer ‘on-
demand’ proximity. Theoretical development will be needed to
understand how some patients can feel protected in a caring
relationship with someone that they barely know, while others
cannot. Here, again, there are clues. One suggestion is that patients
subjectively construct their image of the practitioner to meet their
own safety and dependency needs and in line with their own
mental models of self and other [9,31].
This view predicts that, in general, the more threatening the
illness, the more positive will be the image of the practitioner that
a patient constructs. This view would also explain why patients
seem often to think of practitioners in terms of global character-
istics, such as their personality, rather than speciﬁc behaviours
[20]. Some practitioner behaviours, such as appearing inexpert,
could prevent patients trusting in them and might preclude
patients feeling cared for [9,79–81]. Beyond this minimum,
patients will substantially construct the practitioner they need,albeit having to work harder with some practitioners than others.
Therefore the link between practitioners’ behaviour and patients’
sense of relationship might be weak [82]. Indeed, patients can
describe positive experiences that are not always evident in the
interaction [83]. Similarly ‘improvements’ in practitioners’ com-
munication, such as greater attention to psychosocial problems, do
not necessarily translate into a better patient experience [84,85].
3.5. Individuality and authenticity in clinical relationships
In attachment theory, an attachment ﬁgure (i.e. the care-giver
whose proximity is sought at times of vulnerability) is unique and
irreplaceable. Attachment theory therefore points to patients’ need
to feel that they are in relationships with practitioners who
genuinely care for them. This can explain why a sense of authentic
caring can matter to patients more than polished performance of
generic communication skills and why patients often value
idiosyncratic aspects of practitioners’ behaviour [9,86–88]. Attach-
ment theory usually also envisages that attachment ﬁgures see
those seeking their comfort as unique and irreplaceable. However,
while there is little evidence to show whether practitioners view
patients in this way, it seems unlikely given that they typically see
more patients than they know by name.
Therefore, given the importance of practitioners’ authenticity
for patients [89], conceptual and empirical work will be needed to
understand what authenticity can mean in a clinical context. A
bond between two people who each see the other as uniquely
important will usually be unattainable – and undesirable – in
clinical care, but patients might recognise other kinds of authentic
commitment. For example, they might understand that a practi-
tioner’s jobmeans seeing many patients in a clinic, but experience
authenticity in seeing the practitioner’s character as promising
commitment to the best possible care for every patient.
4. Towards a theory of care
4.1. Attachment and care-giving
Bowlby described a ‘care-giving’ behavioural system centred on
parental roles and complementary to the attachment system [38],
so attachment offers a theory of caring as well as dependence.
Accordingly, a history of good parenting and socialisation, and a
secure attachment style (i.e. positive mental models of oneself and
others) enhance adults’ disposition for caring and their sensitivity
to others’ needs [90–96].
4.2. Attachment in practitioners’ caring
Researchers have begun to apply these ideas to health
practitioners. Specialty choices reﬂect attachment style, securely
attached medical students (i.e. with positive mental models of
themselves and others) being particularly likely to choose primary
care, perhaps because of its emphasis on longer-term relationships
[97,98]. Recent studies of doctors’ interactions with patients
presenting medically unexplained symptoms suggest that attach-
ment style affects doctors’ behaviour once they are working in
primary care too. Doctors with a more positive mental model of
themselves proved to be most ready to contradict these patients’
ideas about their illness or treatment [99]. Similarly, in mental
health care, more secure case managers were more likely to
respond to their patients’ underlying needs, whereas others were
more easily diverted by patients’ own attachment needs, e.g.
providing reassurance to insecure patients who need, instead, to
learn to be independent and not to rely on reassurance [100].
Finding out the relationship between practitioners’ behaviour
and attachment style has already helped to challenge assumptions
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nication specialists deprecate. GPs frequently offer somatic
investigations and treatments when patients with unexplained
symptoms disclose psychological problems [101]. Viewing this as
psychologically defensive led to the prediction that the GPs most
likely to do this would have negative mental models of themselves
and others. Finding that they had more negative models of
themselves but more positive models of others suggested a
different view: that GPs provide somatic intervention because
they value patients (positive model of others) but devalue what
they can offer psychologically (negative model of self) [102].
It would be over-simplistic to propose that secure attachment
in practitioners always favours effective care. Indeed, research in
mental health care suggested that more effective relationships
result where practitioners have styles complementary to patients’,
and so can resist and change those styles [103,104]. For example, a
patient who is hesitant to trust a practitioner would be ill-served
by one who tends to withdraw from signs of others’ dependence,
whereas the same practitioner would be well-equipped to avoid
being drawn into unproductive relationships with a demanding
patient who needs to learn independence.
Although attachment theory assumes some continuity of
attachment style from childhood to adulthood, attachment
security can be manipulated. For example, being prompted
experimentally to recall one’s own experiences of care can
enhance compassion or care-giving [94,95,105,106]. Attachment
theory therefore directly confronts researchers and educators with
the importance of individual differences amongst practitioners and
patients, and empirical and ethical analyses are needed to address
educational implications that arise from acknowledging these. For
example, can or should educators seek to change practitioners’
attachment style, or should they seek to make practitioners aware
of their own styles and to learn to use them, or to compensate for
them?
While practitioners’ attachment styles can explain some
individual differences in caring, they do not explain caring
[49,94]. That is, attachment theory does not identify the
motivation for caring. Indeed, its neglect of motivation for caring
reﬂects its grounding in the maternal relationship and associated
assumptions of innate caring, and it has therefore been criticised
for trivialising the conﬂicts and choices that care-givers experience
[107,108]. One solution to the motivational lacuna in attachment
theory has been to propose an autonomous emotion and
motivation of ‘caring’ [107]. However, this is circular because
the only evidence of the motivation is the phenomenon that the
motivation is imputed to explain [108]. Similarly, Staub [96]
proposed that caring can be away to satisfy a basic human need for
transcendence of self but, again, this circularity offers little help to
educators, who need to understand motivation to care in a way
that explains differences between practitioners and identiﬁes
processes that can be targets of intervention to enhance caring.We
have reached the limits of what attachment theory can offer in
understanding why practitioners care, and why some might care
more than others, andwe need to consider other theories that have
been proposed to explain why practitioners care.
4.3. Understanding practitioners’ motivation to care: looking beyond
attachment theory
4.3.1. The reward of relationships
In clinical literature, an inﬂuential view has been that caring
behaviour is rewarded by the sense of personal fulﬁlment in
‘connecting’ with patients [109,110]. The view has been extended
even to claim that the therapeutic property of the relationship
arises from its meeting the needs of both patient and practitioner
for connection and meaning in their lives [109].As a scientiﬁc account of a possible source of some clinicians’
motivation, this view gains plausibility from evidence that
empathy and sympathy in non-clinical contexts promote caring
and other pro-social behaviour [111]. Moreover, relationships do,
indeed, matter to practitioners, who can feel hurt when patients
end them peremptorily, for example by switching from one
practitioner to another [112]. However, as a normative account of
how practitioners should feel, to link clinical caring to positive
feelings imposes a demanding requirement to feel positive about
all patients at all times and implies not being able to care for a
disliked or emotionally distant patient. Moreover, norms that
govern caring in the personal domain diverge from ethical
principles, such as equity (treating all people as having the same
value) or accountability (the need to justify one’s care to others
such as professional bodies or employers), that must apply
professionally [78,113]. Also, if practitioners prioritise relationship
above other considerations, this can prevent them from addressing
patients’ needs, for example where it reinforces inappropriate
dependence [114]. Portmann [77] criticised the ‘pretence’ that the
clinical relationship is an affectionate one, suggesting that both
patients and practitioners work to construct this illusion as a
defence against the uncertainties of treatment and the threats of
morbidity and mortality that pervade the relationship. A motiva-
tion for practitioners to continue seeking close relationships with
the large number of patients that they have to see is also hard to
reconcile with broader evidence about people’s motivation for
connection in relationships, which is normally satisﬁed by a few
close relationships [115].
4.3.2. Altruism
In striking contrast with the view that caring is based on
affection or relationships from which practitioners directly gain
emotionally is the inﬂuential view that practitioners are altruistic
[113,116]. Altruism is a tricky concept to deﬁne, and behaviour
that appears altruistic can often be explained according to selﬁsh
interests, such as the desire to enhance reputation [117]. More-
over, the face validity of the current culturally prevalent view of
practitioners as altruistic may be weakening as generational
changes shift practitioners’ concern to their own well-being [118].
Bishop and Rees [119] suggest that claims to altruism are generally
best understood as social construction to mask the reality of
ﬁnancial reward for care. Moreover, Glannon and Ross [120]
argued that clinical practice is no more altruistic than other types
of work that involve obligations to others; altruism arises only
where a practitioner goes beyond the role prescribed by their
ﬁduciary relationship with patients. Altruism is therefore not a
plausible theory to understand motivation for care. However, it
does focus attention on the extent to which practitioners value
patients and their well-being, which is likely to be important in a
complete account of professional caring.
4.3.3. Caring as contract
Glannon and Ross [120] and Portmann [77] offered a more
straightforward formulation of motivation for clinical care, and
Meagher provided a similar analysis in relation to social care [121].
That is, practitioners are mostly paid to care as one side of a
contract with their clients. On this reasoning, although practi-
tioners may draw on the norms of the personal sphere, personal
affection for their patients is not part of their contract. Indeed, as
we noted above, practitioners necessarily need to draw on
contrasting societal norms including fairness, equity and freedom
from reciprocal obligations associated with receiving care.
This formulation leads to other problems, however. Whereas
the concept of contract implies agreed expectations, entered into
by equal parties [122], patient–practitioner relationships are
inherently asymmetric. Therefore, what is deﬁned by the clinical
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intersection of professional norms, contract and employment law
and, where public provision is concerned, relationships between
the individual and the state. The nature of the contract will depend
on situational factors, and practitioners’ understanding of their
professional role, too. For example, whether practitioners’ ‘con-
tracts’ include responsibility for patients’ social and emotional
well-being in surgery is unclear, although this would be generally
assumed in hospices [78,123].
4.3.4. The authenticity of practitioners’ care
Extending beyond attachment theory to considering these
other diverse attempts to explain practitioners’ caring still does
not provide a complete account of caring. The main value of these
different theoretical approaches is to identify the issues that
communication researchers and educators will need to consider
and that gowell beyond the prevailing concernwith practitioners’
‘communication skills’ or ‘relationship skills’. Attachment theory
points to the role of practitioners’ emotional security in under-
standing their motivation to care; and ideas of caring as
‘emotional connection’ point to the potential importance of
practitioners’ own emotional experiences with patients. Discus-
sions of altruism point to the need to consider practitioners’
attitudes, or values, and accounts of professional caring as
contract point to the need to understand practitioners’ views of
their own contracted role.
These different perspectives suggest an approach to practi-
tioners’ authenticity to mirror the analysis that we proposed of
patients’ need for authenticity. Different sources of practitioner
motivation would each imply a different type of authenticity in
caring—from feeling affection for patients, through valuing them as
fellow humans, to determination to fulﬁl the professional role as
expertly as possible. Investigating how these compare with what
patients seek might help to turn the conundrum of authenticity in
clinical communication into an area of research and theorising
with practical beneﬁts [124].
5. Practice implications for enhancing and assessing
communication
We previously argued that a broader theoretical base is
necessary to understand clinical relationships from the perspective
of patients’ dependence on practitioners’ expertise [1]. Here, we
have shown that relevant theory is available, although theoretical
lacunae and contradictions point to priorities for clinical commu-
nication researchers. These will only be worth pursuing if practical
implications are likely, so we conclude by demonstrating that
signiﬁcant implications already arise.
5.1. A functional approach to teaching and assessing communication
Whereas current consensus emphasises types of communica-
tion, such as breaking bad news, providing information or
attending to psychological cues, we suggest focussing on its
functions [125], such as hope or feeling cared for [31,126]. Thiswill
complicate teaching because a single type of communication,
such as providing information, can serve different, conﬂicting
functions. Educators can, though, draw on a developing literature
about how communication addresses the needs that matter to
patients and itwill be important to be guided by the clues that this
contains rather than by what has mattered to researchers and
educators. Recognising patients’ need to trust practitioners’
authority and expertise as a starting point may bring ‘new’
communication strategies into teaching, such as persuasion or
argumentation [127]. Recognising that practitioners sometimes
need to counter inappropriate dependence, being able to neglectrather than facilitate psychological cues might sometimes be the
important skill [128,129]. Because tension is inherent in many
practitioner–patient relationshipswhere patients seek safety that
practitioners cannot provide, educators need to help practitioners
go beyond merely diffusing or avoiding conﬂict, to conduct it
effectively to meet patients’ needs when these diverge from their
requests [130].
Therewill need to be corresponding changes in assessment, too.
In many situations, successful communication of safety, trust,
caring and hope, or identifying and managing conﬂict, will be
clinically valid subjects for assessment. However, this will be
practically more challenging than assessment of current priorities
such as providing information or responding to psychological cues.
5.2. Teaching and assessing subjectivity
The areas of theory reviewed here, particularly attachment
theory, are incompatible with the currently prevalent view of
relationships as objective things that, once ‘built’, will be
experienced similarly by each party. Both patients and practi-
tioners can construct their own sense of relationship, reﬂecting
their own needs and only partly visible in communication that
passes between them. Instead of recycling the metaphor that
communication skills build relationships, educators need to help
practitioners to recognise and work with the subjective sense of
relationship that patients might have, reﬂecting their vulnerability
and dependency needs.
Acknowledging the subjectivity of relationships opens new
directions for assessment, too. The need for reliability and fairness
puts a premium on ‘objective’ behaviours, but assessing these can
only be clinically valid for the few behaviours or situations that
leave little room for subjectivity in how they are experienced. In
situations where patients’ subjective experience of communica-
tion is likely to depend on their or their practitioners’ individual
characteristics, assessmentwill need tomakemore use of ‘global’ –
i.e. subjective – ratings [131]. A second implication is that quality
of communication does not follow a linear scale. Certain
communication behaviours will preclude patients from construct-
ing any sense of relationship [9] but, in the absence of these, the
quality of relationship that patients sense might be only loosely
related to practitioners’ communication. This is recognised, but not
yet explicitly, in current assessment approaches in many schools
which emphasise, not the reward of excellence, but the detection
of unacceptable communication.
5.3. Teaching and assessing individuality and authenticity
Reﬂecting patients’ concern with practitioners’ authenticity
and individuality, educators need to ﬁnd ways to nurture this in
the context of generic training programmes, and to acknowledge
that different practitioners might have different motivations for
caring and that different patients might look for different sources
of practitioners’ authenticity. As a start, attachment theory
provides a framework that can give individual differences a
central place so that communication teaching is tailored according
to clinicians’ character as well as individual patients’ needs [132].
Implications for assessment are profound because the impor-
tance of authenticity challenges the validity of simulation in
assessment [133]. Perhaps, at best, simulated-patient encounters
might only detect students who lack the ability, or are too
overwhelmed by anxiety to appear to be concerned for a patient
[134]; at worst, by rewarding pretence, they might inadvertently
teach inauthenticity [89]. If educators are not to give up on
measuring the quality of practitioners’ clinical relationships, they
may need to focus on real patients’ experiences of their students,
with all the complexities that will entail.
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Communication teaching is dominated by the concept of
communication as skill. While this has helped to establish
communication in clinical curricula alongside traditional skills,
over-emphasis on skill detracts from patient beneﬁt [1,125,131].
To apply the ideas outlined here, we need to expand the conceptual
framework for understanding practitioners’ communication.
Attachment theory introduces emotional mechanisms but is a
cognitive theory, too, in which mental models are central. Just as
the strength of practitioners’ motivation for technical tasks drives
clinical practice and outcome [135], educators need to be
concerned with their motivation to care. Although motivation
remains a confusing ﬁeld, it is clear that it will mean addressing
practitioners’ values, attitudes and sense of professional role.
In practice, many communication curricula already include
teaching at the levels of cognition, emotion and attitudes, with
topics such as ‘understanding the patient’s perspective’, ‘dealing
with emotion’ or ‘cultural competence’ [136–138]. Whereas
allegiance to the concept of communication skill obscures these
levels, future educators could be explicit about them so that
educational interventions are tailored to each, and sequenced in a
way that is theoretically grounded in understanding how they
interact. Concern with practitioners’ emotions and values, in
particular, promises ethical and educational challenges in choosing
the goals and methods of teaching [137,139]. Epstein suggested
that compassion is promoted by ‘mindful practice’; that is, critical,
but non-judgmental attention to one’s ownmental processeswhen
with patients [131,140]. Others [131,141,142] have suggested that
empathy is achieved by ‘deep acting’, whereby cognitive processes
(e.g. imaginingwhat the patient is experiencing) change emotional
reactions so that behaviour changes naturally, or that curricula
could explicitly teach and assess moral reasoning [143]. Others go
further in advocating immersion in patients’ narratives [89] or
even in patient roles [144]. Educators and researchers need to
examine whether such approaches achieve the authenticity that
patients seek orwhether addressing values directly is necessary for
any kind of empathic work [145].
Our analysis again complicates assessment. Conceptualised as
behavioural skill, communication quality can be objectively
measured by sampling micro-skills in simulated-patient encoun-
ters. On the present analysis, educators will need to ﬁnd ways to
assess, not only behavioural demonstration of skills, but also
whether the student knows when to use them (cognitive level), is
sufﬁciently at easewith patients to use them (emotional level), and
cares enough about patients to use them in everyday practice
(values).
6. Conclusion
By extending the theoretical grounding of clinical communica-
tion, researchers and educators can accommodate patients’
vulnerability and practitioners’ caring without returning to the
moral and scientiﬁc constraints ofmedical paternalism. The theory
and research that we have reviewed presents new dilemmas. Some
will be resolved by further research and theoretical development
about how patients and clinicians are, but others may lead to
normative questions about how they should be. There are already
potential implications for how teaching and assessment can
become more theoretically grounded and better represent
patients’ interests.
Even though the patient–practitioner relationship shares the
asymmetry in expertise and vulnerability that deﬁnes classic
attachment relationships in childhood, attachment theory is
incomplete as an account of clinical relationships. Therefore, it
is important not simply to replace over-simplistic but morallyappealing metaphors, like ‘patients as partners’ or ‘building
relationships’, by new ones, like ‘attachment’ or ‘authenticity’,
which will also be over-simpliﬁcations or will prove to have
restricted applicability [49]. The inherent contextual speciﬁcity
and time-varying nature of clinical relationships [146] will
demand a diversity of theories [20]. Arguably, the ﬁeld of clinical
communication has reached a stage of maturity in which
theoretical pluralism offers more than does adherence to
theoretical hegemonies. Nevertheless, it will be important to
ensure that we do not lose sight of the vulnerability and
dependence that are intrinsic to being ill and needing health care.
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